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Abstract: The diversity in strength of International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) is investigated by 
examining the impact of the levels of economic and political (institutional) integration. Working from 
a neo-functionalist perspective, a higher level of any of the two types of integration, as well as an 
initial IGO task in the economic issue area, is expected to lead to a stronger IPI. These hypotheses 
have been tested through a cross-sectional quantitative data analysis of 23 IPIs, using the Integration 
Achievement Score (IAS) and a measure for institutional integration. Both types of integration are 
found to be positively related to the strength of IPOs. Meanwhile, this cannot be said of the 
economic initial function of IGOs.    
Introduction 
Although definitions and typologies differ (e.g. Kissling, 2011; Rocabert et al., 2014; Cofelice, 2015), 
there seems to be a consensus among scholars of International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) that 
the number of IPIs has steadily increased since the end of the Cold War (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014, 
p.148). However, there is a wide diversity amongst these IPIs with regard to their strength. Whereas 
the European Parliament (EP) is relatively strong and considered more and more as a parliament with 
true legislative powers (Kraft-Kasack, 2008; Lingen & Cutler, 2008), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) 
is weak and seems far from having any such powers (Zondi, 2011, p.26; Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014, 
p.157). It is clear that the gist of the population of IPIs is being considered ineffective and weak 
(Rocabert et al., 2014). 
What, then, explains this variation in strength (or weakness) of IPIs? A number of explanations have 
been put forward (Malamud & Sousa, 2007; Nzewi, 2014; Bechle & Rüland, 2014). Is the dominant 
regime type of an IPIs’ member states an important predictor (Nzewi, 2014), or is the number of 
member states of importance? Although member states could very well be pivotal in determining the 
specific strength of IPIs, the development of IGOs itself seems to have a larger impact: this factor is 
more closely related to the institutional development of an IGO. A more plausible clarification then is 
the level of integration of the International Governmental Organization (IGO) an IPI belongs to. As 
Malamud and Sousa (2007) ascertain, the European Union (EU) is integrated further both 
economically and politically than all of the IGOs in Latin America and its EP is stronger than any of its 
Latin American counterparts. Thus, it might be that the “further” an IGO is integrated, the stronger 
its IPI is. For this has not been investigated in detail, it is of interest to do this: by attaining insight 
into how an IGO becomes “parliamentarized” and its dynamics of integration, the institutional 
behaviour of IPIs and the IGO as a whole can be understood better.  
This is what will be examined in this thesis, as formulated in the following research question: Do the 
levels of economic and political integration of IGOs influence the power of IPIs vis-a-vis their 
organization? 
The measurement of variables is carried out using a number of indicators, of which its scores are 
reached through consultation of a wide range of sources. Through the use of, amongst others,  
multiple linear regression, as well as an independent t-test, the data is quantitatively analysed. But 
first, each of the relevant concepts is specified and the theoretical approach is put forward.  
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Conceptualization and theoretical approach 
To start with, let us take a look at the main concept of this thesis. Like the name indicates, 
International Parliamentary Institutions are parliaments operating in an international context. These 
institutions can be defined as ‘assemblies of parliamentarians from differing states that have been 
given an internal structure by adopting working mechanisms’ (Kraft-Kasack, 2008, p.535). Although 
there is only a rather small amount of academic literature on IPIs, a wide range of classifications 
exist. As Rocabert et al. (2014) adequately observe, IPIs differ on three main dimensions, namely 1) 
constitutional status, 2) institutional authority and 3) institutionalisation.    
 The first, the constitutional status, refers to the formal institutional links of IPIs. Kissling 
(2011) clearly shows a fair number of IPIs are autonomous organizations and, thus are not at all 
related to an IGO. Another, smaller, group of IPIs holds informal relations, meaning that these 
parliamentary institutions are not formally acknowledged as being part of an IGO.  These two types 
will, however, not be the focus of this thesis. Here, only IPIs clearly affiliated to an IGO are analysed. 
To be precise, these IPIs can be called International Parliamentary Organs (IPOs) (Sabic, 2008), i.e. 
organs of IGOs composed of parliamentarians. The other IPIs are not as intensely involved in the 
integration process of IGOs (Cofelice, 2015) and, therefore, are not analysed here.    
 The second dimension, institutional authority, concerns the degree to which an IPI has 
authority, either towards member states’ parliaments, the IGO to which it is affiliated or both, over 
the affairs, the actors (within and beyond a related IGO) and own internal rules. The third and last 
dimension is the level of institutionalisation. IPIs having strong internal institutions, such as an 
extensive committee system, will most likely operate more effectively and efficiently than IPIs lacking 
these (Rocabert et al., 2014).          
 Each of the dimensions provides us with an idea of the power of IPIs. An IPI not (formally) 
affiliated to an IGO, having little institutional authority and lacking operational institutions can easily 
be considered less powerful than an IPI which is recognized by an IGO, holds a considerable 
autonomy over many features and is extensively institutionalized.    
As discussed above, the most likely factor explaining the different levels in institutional authority and 
institutionalisation is integration, of which different forms can be identified. Nye (1968) distinguishes 
between three main types of integration, namely economic, social and political integration, all of 
which can be subdivided once more. In the case of political integration, four types are identified by 
Nye, one of which is institutional integration1. As Mattlin (2005) points out, economic and (political) 
institutional integration are the principal forms of integration and can take place separately. 
Economic integration is understood here as ‘encompassing measures designed to abolish 
discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states’ (Balassa, 2011, p.1). 
Furthermore, institutional integration is defined as ‘deliberate and sustained political actions which 
aim at bringing about a closer union of political and economic institutions of two or more political 
entities’ (Mattlin, 2005, p.405).      
Economic integration can be divided into 5 stages, namely 1) free trade zone, 2) customs union, 3) 
common market, 4) economic union (including monetary union) and 5) a political union (Balassa, 
2011; Cohn, 2014). Institutional integration can be divided into five stages as well, ranging between 
                                                            
1 This is emphasized, because institutional and political integration are used interchangeably by several 
scholars. Furthermore, when no adjective is used, than integration in general is meant. Moreover, political 
(institutional) integration is not equivalent to institutionalization itself (Dri,2009). 
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mere cooperation to a full supranational structure (Nye, 1968). First is ‘ad hoc intergovernmental 
political cooperation’ (pure cooperation, no institutionalization), the second is ‘institutionalized 
intergovernmental cooperation’. The third stage is ‘institutionalized intergovernmental coordination’ 
(in which activities of member states are centrally coordinated), the fourth is ‘partial or supra-
nationalized integration’ (substantial decisional authority is delegated to a supranational organ) and 
the last is ‘full integration’, resembling the political union in the stages of economic integration 
(Dosenrode, 2010, pp.8-9). As becomes clear from this summary, both forms of integration could 
lead to the same final stage, but need not correlate. Therefore, it could be that an IGO is extensively 
economically integrated, but institutionally only to a minor extent – and vice versa.         
The influential, but highly contested approach of neo-functionalism has been the dominant theory 
for explaining transnational integration from the late 1950s to the 1970s (Jensen, 2013). Predicated 
on the early development of the European Community (EC) (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009), neo-
functionalists conceive of integration as an incremental process developing in a linear manner, 
whereby states increasingly delegate decisional authority to an international organization (Schmitter, 
1970): ‘a process ‘upwards’ to some sort of final stage of a ‘federal union’’ (Wessels, 1997, p.273). In 
other words, through integration first and foremost new political institutions are created, of which its 
officials are considered important actors in the furthering of integration (Diez & Wiener, 2009). With 
the granting of decisional authority to supranational institutions, an issue of accountability comes 
forward (Habegger, 2010): how to guarantee vertical accountability (i.e. towards citizens) in an 
international organization, while its competences are expanding? Although some argue this can be 
achieved by creating a number of non-conventional mechanisms (Keohane, 2005 in Habegger, 2010) 
- such as scrutiny of immediate stakeholders -, establishing majoritarian institutions is the main way 
to do so (Rittberger, 2003). Put otherwise, to increase the democratic legitimacy of international 
organizations, institutions that are directly accountable to voters or elected officials are often 
considered the best way to resolve the issue (Marschall, 2007). In this view, the rise of IPIs must be 
seen.       
Neo-functionalism has been criticized heavily on several aspects. Firstly, the constant gradual 
integration process foreseen by neo-functionalists did not take place in the EC in the 1970s and early 
1980s as intense as predicted, although the EC formed the basis of neo-functionalist premises 
(Jensen, 2013). Secondly, states proved to remain relevant and pivotal actors in the development of 
IGOs, in contrast to what the early neo-functionalists claimed (Rosamond, 2000). According to 
Moravcsik (2005) executives on the supranational level are hardly decisive in furthering the process. 
Although relevant, these criticisms have not led to the outright rejection of neo-functionalism. The 
integration process of the EC seemed to reflect the neo-functionalists’ perspective once more from 
the middle 1980s, as further, unintended, institutionalization took place (Jensen, 2013). With regard 
to the first criticism, the ‘linear’ integration process described above should not be seen as a rigid 
template in all cases. Rather, it would be better to speak of a gradual process of structural ‘linear’ 
growth, in which small cycles occur (Wessels, 1997, p.272). In other words, a fundamental backlash, 
nor a fully linear process would - in neither of the cases - fit reality. Concerning the second criticism, 
the role of “supranational” officials in furthering integration may not be pivotal, the main officials still 
wield considerable influence (Jensen, 2013). All in all then, neo-functionalism still is a very useful 
approach for explaining integration and institutional development.        
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Taking the considerations discussed above into account, it can still be maintained that the further an 
IGO is integrated, either economically or institutionally (or both), the deeper it will be 
institutionalized and the stronger its democratic institutions will be. Therefore, it can be expected 
that  
H1: The higher the level of economic integration, the stronger an IPI 
H2: The higher the level of political integration, the stronger an IPI 
According to neo-functionalists, integration is facilitated through “spill-over”, in which ‘integration in 
one sector creates incentives for integration in other sectors and further delegation of authority in 
the same sector’ (Malamud & Dri, 2013, p.227). This is expected to be most successful and intensive 
in case the IGO’s initial function (i.e. task) is economic (Haas, 1961, p.372), because interdependence 
between economic sectors is high. In this way, economic integration is expected to activate and 
intensify institutional integration, as well as leading to deeper institutionalization (Illievsky, 2015). 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: IGOs with an initial economic function have stronger IPIs than IGOs with other initial functions     
With the hypotheses formulated, the methods for testing these are set forward in the following 
section.  
Research methods 
The hypotheses are tested through cross-sectional quantitative data analysis. The independent 
variables constitute the levels of economic and political integration and the dependent variable is the 
power of the IPIs. All IPOs, as determined by Cofelice and Stavridis (2014) and Cofelice (2015), are 
included in the analysis. There is an extensive overlap between the two, but two issues become 
apparent. First, it should be noted that Cofelice and Stavridis (2014) include an extra IPO, of the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). At the same time, they do not include the IPO of the Organisation 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), whereas Cofelice (2015) does. Second, the IPO affiliated to the 
Eurasian Economic Community has ceased to exist.The number of IPOs that are examined then is 23 
(see Appendix A, Table A1). Since only IPOs are explored, one cannot speak of a sample of IPIs, but 
rather an analysis of the whole population of IPOs. This leads to low external validity, for it is not 
possible to generalize to other types of IPIs. This should not be considered problematic though, for 
the cases examined are, on the one hand, a fair number of the total amount of IPIs and, on the other 
hand, are simply all of those to which the research question of this thesis applies.   
The initial function of the IGO is determined by looking at what policy issues were addressed first in 
which issue area (Table 6). Four different kinds of functions have been identified by Lindberg (1970): 
external relations, political-constitutional, social-cultural and economic. In most cases, the IGO itself 
states clearly in its founding treaty in which issue area its objective(s) lies, but because a large 
number of IGOs address multiple issue areas, secondary literature has been consulted to check which 
specific area has been most prevalent in the foundational years of the IGOs.   
To measure the level of economic integration of an IGO, the Integration Achievement Score (IAS) is 
used. The IAS has originally been designed by Huffbauer and Schott and has been refined by Feng 
and Genna (2003), who use a Guttman scale with values between 0 (lowest) and 5 (highest). It 
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consists of six components, namely 1) trade in goods and services, 2) degree of capital mobility, 3) 
degree of labour mobility, 4) level of supranational institution importance, 5) degree of monetary 
policy coordination and 6) degree of fiscal policy coordination. For the scale of each indicator and the 
results, see appendix B below. The final IAS score for an IGO is reached through determining the 
average of all scores aggregated. It should be noted that economic integration in a given year (2012) 
is measured, instead of all years for all IGOs, as this would be beyond the scope of the thesis. This 
leads to moderate measurement validity, for it could be argued that to properly measure the level of 
integration more years should be included. However, the independent variables are not the 
development in the levels of integration, but the current levels itself.     
 The year 2012 was chosen for two reasons. From a theoretical perspective, a lag between the 
levels of integration and the eventual power of IPOs can be expected: for further integration to 
materialize into empowerment of an IPI, some time is needed. As Malamud and Sousa (2007) point 
out, institutional structures change gradually, preceded (possibly) by an increasing level of 
integration. Also, a consideration of a more practical nature led to this choice: 2012 is a year for 
which a large amount of data was available. This “time lag” is executed as well for institutional 
integration, to maintain consistency and reliability.       
 Not all of the IPIs have integrated economically, namely six out of 23. As such, the values for 
these cases are treated as missing data, because scoring these cases 0 (no economic integration) 
would give flaw the actual results: these cases simply have not integrated economically on purpose, 
instead of proclaiming the goal of economic integration and not suffice to this goal (as is the case 
with the BSEC). In the analysis discussed below, it will become clear that the regression models in 
which economic integration is included thus have a lower number of cases. 
In order to measure institutional integration, two different components are examined: bureaucratic 
and jurisdictional (Nye, 1968). The bureaucratic aspect can be measured by comparing the absolute 
budgets of IGOs, thereby providing an indication of strength of each IGO. Nye (1968) states 
additionally the administrative staff of IGOs should be compared as well. This has proven too difficult 
however, due to a serious lack of data.         
 The jurisdictional component can be measured by examining three indicators. First, the 
degree of supranationality, which can be determined through a scale of 5 values (appendix C), is 
included. This is a measure of the dominant decision-making principle in the main executive organ. In 
many IGOs, the institutional structure roughly mirrors the one of the EU: a council of the heads of 
state, a council of ministers for each of the concerning fields of policy, a court, a parliament and a 
commission. For, in practically all of these cases, the commission can be regarded as the main 
executive organ, it is sensible to analyse the decision-making principle in this organ: it forms a good 
indication of the extent to which the main supranational structure has been granted power. If no 
such commission exists and only a secretariat is concerned with the operations of the IGO, the 
decision-making principle in the council of ministers is taken as reference point.  
 Second, the so-called ‘locus of activity’ (Lindberg, 1970, pp.675-675) has been decided, on a 
scale from 0 to 6. This indicator, consisting of three elements and specified in detail by Lindberg, 
measures to what degree the concerning policy issues are carried out collectively within the 
framework of the IGO. The last indicator is the fourth component of the IAS, namely the level of 
supranational institution importance. It was chosen not to include this indicator in the measurement 
of economic integration, since it does not necessarily refer to economic, but rather to institutional 
integration. From these three indicators, one variable has been formed, by calculating an aggregated 
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mean, whereby all of the items are weighted equally. This is equivalent to the calculation of the IAS. 
 In order to make sure the three indicators can be merged to form a valid tool for measuring 
institutional integration, a principal component analysis has been carried out (Table 1). Only one of 
the components has an eigenvalue higher than 1 (which is over Kaiser’s criterion; Field, 2009), no 
rotated solution can be reached (which provides a solution to how to merge the components) and, 
hence, no rotated component loadings are calculated. Therefore, it can be argued the three 
indicators should not be merged to form one variable, but, as discussed above, the indicators each 
measure a different aspect and, together with the high amount of explained variance of each of the 
indicators, it was chosen to maintain the variable. This can also be argued by looking at the unrotated 
component loadings, of which all values are above the criterion of 0,4 (Field, 2009). These suggest 
that each of the components do actually represent their related indicators.  
Table 1. Principal component analysis institutional integration 
 Component matrix Initial eigenvalues % of variance 
Component 1 (Degree of 
supranationality) 
 
0,51* 1,738 57,93 
Component 2 (Locus of 
activity) 
 
0,84* 0,879 29,30 
Component 3 (Supranat. 
Inst. Import.) 
 
0,88* 0,383 12,78 
Total   100,00 
*Unrotated component loadings above the criterion of 0,4 
The measurement of the strength of IPIs has been carried out in keeping with the conceptualisation 
of IPIs put forward above. The dimension of “Institutional authority”, consisting of 2 elements, 
competences and autonomy, is measured through using the “Parliamentary Powers”-Index designed 
by Cofelice and Stavridis (2014), encompassing the different functions (consultation, oversight, 
appointment, budgetary and legislation) of IPIs and each being scored on a scale of 0 (no powers) to 
5 (most powerful). From the values, a weighted mean is calculated for each of the cases (see 
Appendix C).            
 In cooperation with three other students, the data of the index has been updated. For it has 
proven difficult to find (or create at shorthand) a proper method of measurement for other 
components, such as “autonomy”, it was chosen only to additionally measure the budgets of IPIs and 
their related IGOs. This data can, however, provide an image of the autonomy of the IPO. The larger 
the resources of an IPO, the larger its possibilities seem to scrutinize its IGO. From the principal 
component analysis (Table 2) it becomes clear it is best not to merge the two components and treat 
the factors as one predictor. This is indicated by the scree plot (where only the PPI lies above the 
inflexion point) and the eigenvalues, of which only one of the two components has a value above 1 
(1,69 to be precise). The unrotated component loadings show that both of the components do 
represent their indicators. 
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Table 2. Principal component analysis PPI and Budget of IPI 
 Component matrix Initial eigenvalues % of variance 
Component 1 (PPI) 
 
0,92* 1,693 84,64 
Component 2 (Budget of 
IPI) 
Total 
0,92* 0,307 15,36 
 
100,00 
*Unrotated component loadings above the criterion of 0,4 
In order to ensure reasonable internal validity, a number of control variables are included in the 
research design (Appendix E). First of all, the dominant regime type in IPIs was reached through use 
of the 2015 Democracy Index of The Economist Intelligence Unit. For each member state of an IGO, 
the value is determined. Consequently, an average score is calculated from all of the values 
altogether. As Malamud and Sousa (2007) set forth, IGOs in which member states are predominantly 
democratic are more likely to have a stronger IPI. Also, the dominant regime type could impact the 
level of (mostly institutional) integration. Democratic states are more concerned with the democratic 
legitimacy intergovernmental cooperation might lack (see above) and, hence, an IPI could be granted 
considerable power to mitigate this democratic deficit.      
 Next to this, the “age” of IPOs is taken over from the data of Cofelice (2015), measured in 
whole years. Also, the number of member states has been found by consulting the information from 
the official websites of IGOs. Furthermore, the operating level (either regional or transregional) can 
be found in academic works. However, defining the boundaries of regions is a serious issue, in which 
often arbitrary choices are made (Genna & De Lombaerde, 2010). This can be noticed as well by 
comparing the choices herein made by Cofelice (2015, p.16) and Cofelice and Stavridis (2014, p.153): 
whereas Cofelice assigns the Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS PA) as “transregional”, Cofelice and Stavridis have chosen to treat the CIS PA as a central-
western Asiatic IPI. Also, in the data analysis, quantifying the operating level has been found to be 
problematic. Therefore, it has been chosen not to control for this variable, as this might only confuse 
the real effect of the other predictors on the dependent variables. This is an issue that should at least 
be reckoned with when discussing the results, for these could be biased due to this exclusion.  
In reaching the scores of the IAS and the values for institutional integration, both primary and 
secondary sources were consulted. In all of the cases, the founding treaty and relevant amendments 
were examined, as well as additional information from the official website. However, in a large 
number of cases – most notably the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) and the League of Arab States (LAS) 
– these sources do not provide sufficient (and reliable) information. Therefore, for each case, at least 
two supplementary secondary sources were considered, ranging from excerpts of scientific 
encyclopaedias to reports of (non-) governmental organizations and academic articles (Appendix G, 
Table G1).    
Data and results 
Before getting into detail, let us have a look at the descriptive statistics (Table 3). On average, the 
level of competences of IPOs is 0,26; ranging from 0,07 to 0,89. This proves the weakness of IPOs, for 
the average level of competences is rather low. The average budget score is 2,45; which means the 
mean for the budget lies between 2 and 10 million euros. Next to this, 17 of the 23 cases have 
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integrated economically, which does not imply that all of these IGOs had an initial economic function. 
At the same time nonetheless, one of the IGOs that committed themselves to economic integration 
has not made progress in any way (the BSEC). Therefore, the minimum level of economic integration 
is 0. Moreover, all of the IGOs have, as a minimum, integrated institutionally to a score of 1. This 
value corresponds most accurately to the second stage put forth by Dosenrode (2010), namely 
“institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation”.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean SD Min.  Max. Units/scale 
Parliamentary Power 
Index 
23 0,26 0,22 0,07 0,89 0 - 1 scale, 1 = 
full 
competences 
Budget of IPI2 11 2,45 1,29 1,00 5,00 0 – 5 scale, 5 
= more than 1 
billion euros 
Institutional 
integration 
23 2,04 0,72 0,67 4,00 0 – 5 scale, 5 
= full political 
integration 
IAS (economic 
integration) 
17 1,80 1,21 0,00 3,80 0 – 5 scale, 5 
= full 
economic 
integration 
Degree of   
supranationality 
23 1,91 0,95 1,00 4,00 0 – 5 scale, 5 
= decisions 
made by 
administrative 
organs 
Locus of activity 23 2,00 1,13 0,00 5,00 0 – 6 scale, 6 
= all activity at 
collective level  
Supranational 
institution importance 
23 2,22 0,80 1,00 4,00 0 – 5 scale, 5 
= supranational 
instit. operate 
as primary 
decision node 
Trade in goods and 
services 
17 2,53 1,70 0,00 5,00 0 – 5 scale, 5 
= no barriers 
Degree of capital 
mobility 
17 2,00 1,87 0,00 5,00 0 – 5 scale, 5 
= full mobility 
Degree of labor 
mobility 
17 1,65 1,54 0,00 5,00 0 – 5 scale, 5 
= full mobility 
Degree of monetary 
policy coordination 
17 1,71 1,99 0,00 5,00 0 – 5 scale, 5 
= single 
currency 
Degree of fiscal policy 
coordination 
17 1,00 0,87 0,00 3,00 0 – 5 scale, 
5 = single 
budget 
Dominant regime type 223 5,82 1,97 2,40 9,53 0 – 10 scale, 
8-10 = full 
democracy4  
Age of IPI 23 26,17 19,45 4,00 67,00      Years 
Number of member 
states 
23 15,35 16,11 3,00 57,00 Member    
states 
                                                            
 
3 No data available on any of the member states of the OECS in the EUI. To correct for this, the EUI score for the 
IGO most  closely related to the OECS (with member states in the same region) has been duplicated: the 
CARICOM. 
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To get a first impression of the presence (or absence) of a relationship between the predictors and 
the dependent variables, for each of the possible relations a scatterplot has been conducted. Figure 
1a displays a positive linear relationship between economic integration and parliamentary power, 
with an explained variance of 0,168. Although the effect is weak, on the face of it economic 
integration seems to positively influence the level of competences IPIs have. This can also be said of 
institutional integration (Figure 1b), which has a higher value for the explained variance (R2 = 0,208). 
What becomes clear right away from these graphs as well is the presence of (at least) one case 
deviating strongly from the regression line and somewhat distorted distributions. Both issues will be 
discussed below.  
Figure 1a. Economic integration and PPI and Figure 1b. Institutional integration and PPI
          
Integration and the Parliamentary Power Index 
Since the research design consists of two independent variables and a dependent variable with 
interval measurement levels, the most fitting test is a multiple linear regression. Before discussing 
the results of the test, the absence of correlation between the independent variables has to be 
checked for, in order to make sure there is no multicollinearity (Field, 2009, p.220)5. As stated before, 
economic and institutional integration can, eventually, end up in the same stage - a political union -, 
but can take place independently and each can have different levels. As such, it is reasonable to 
expect a modest level of correlation. From the values of the bivariate correlation coefficients, it 
becomes clear that this is the case. With a value of 0,55 (p < 0,05), Pearson’s r is high, but certainly 
not high enough to speak of multicollinearity: the two variables should correlate as high as 
approximately 0,8 or even higher to come to such conclusion (Field, 2009, p.224). Neither is this the 
case for the other pairs of variables, since, of the other bivariate correlation coefficients, none of the 
values is higher than 0,8 (or even 0,9). Also, the PPI correlates highest with institutional integration (r 
= 0,46; p < 0,05), which is significant at the 0,05 level. Because the number of cases is low, a more 
adequate significance level would be 0,01; but the value nonetheless confirms the relationship 
between institutional integration and the level of competences of IPIs. Economic integration (r = 
                                                            
5 The other assumptions for carrying out multiple linear regression – such as normality – were checked for as 
well, but are not discussed in the main text, because these have not shown anomalies. With regard to the 
assumption of normality of the residuals, the results of the tests can be found in appendix F (tables F1 and F2). 
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0,41)6, and the number of member states (r  = 0,21; p=0,33) on the other hand, show weaker 
correlations, both not significant.  
A hierarchical multiple linear regression has been carried out, whereby the first model consists only 
of institutional integration and the second of economic integration as predictor. In the third model, 
the two are combined and in the fourth, the control variables are included. This sequence is chosen, 
for the first two predictors are expected to have the largest effect on the dependent variable. All of 
this can be seen in Table 4: economic integration has the largest effect of all of the predictors (B = 
0,11; model 4), but this is still relatively minor and not significant. The same can be said of 
institutional integration, which apparently has a very small positive relationship (B = 0,02; model 4)7. 
However, the coefficients of the two independent variables in the fourth model do confirm the 
earlier discussed positive relationship with IPI competences. At the same time, when controlling for 
other predictors, it turns out the “number of member states” has a minor negative relationship (B = -
0,07; model 4) with regard to the degree of IPI competences. This suggests that the more member 
states are part of an IGO, the less powerful its IPI is.   
Table 4. Hierarchical multiple linear regression for the Parliamentary Power Index 
 Model 1      Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    B                   B     B                      B                   
(intercept) -0,02               0,13  0,02   0,23           
 (0,16) (0,10) (0,17) (0,22) 
Institutional integration  0,14            
(0,07) 
  0,08                
(0,09) 
 0,02                    
(0,12) 
Economic integration   0,07  0,055               0,11                    
  (0,44) (0,056) (0,06) 
Number of member 
states 
   -0,07                  
(0,04) 
Dominant regime type     0,005                  
(0,005) 
Age of IPI     0,006                  
(0,006) 
      
     
R2 0,21 0,17 0,21 0,44 
Adj. R2 0,15 0,11 0,10 0,18 
N 23 17 17 17 
Note: OLS-regression coefficients, with standard deviations between brackets 
Integration and the budget of IPIs 
With regard to the relationship between integration and the budget of IPOs, the bivariate correlation 
coefficients point to a significant correlation with institutional integration (r = 0,629; p < 0,05)8, but a 
very low correlation with economic integration (r = 0,008). This image is confirmed by the 
                                                            
6 N = 17 
7 Here, the impact of excluding the six cases from the final analysis with economic integration becomes clear: 
the value of the R2 in model 1 is equal to the value of the R2 in model 3. Nonetheless, as discussed in the 
methods section, the exclusion of these cases is justified from a theoretical perspective. 
8 N = 11 
11 
 
scatterplots below: Figure 2a shows a positive relationship between institutional integration and IPI 
budget, whereas the weak relationship between economic integration and budget in Figure 2b shows 
no straightforward direction.  
Figure 2a. Institutional integration and IPI budget and Figure 2b. Economic integration and IPI budget 
         
Table 5. Hierarchical regression for IPI budget, with economic integration excluded in the first model 
 Model  1      Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     B                     B     B                      B                    
(intercept)  0,16             2,44 -0,09   1,92           
 (1,23) (0,93) (1,54) (4,56) 
Institutional 
integration 
 1,12*            
(0,57) 
  1,59               
(0,72) 
 2,06                
(1,57) 
Economic 
integration 
 
 0,009 
(0,44) 
 -0,45            
(0,46) 
-0,61               
(1,18) 
Dominant regime 
type 
   -0,52               
(0,72) 
Age of IPI     0,02               
(0,10) 
Number of member 
states 
   -0,007               
(0,06) 
     
R2 0,39 0,000 0,49 0,81 
Adj. R2 0,29 -0,17 0,29 0,34 
N 11 8 8 8 
Note: OLS-regression coefficients, with standard deviations between brackets 
 *p <0,05 
 
In Table 5, the multiple linear regression is shown. With none of the predictors being significant, 
institutional integration has the largest effect. Due to the large amount of missing data on IPI 
budgets, only a small number of cases determine the results. This inhibits adequate conclusions on 
the presence or absence of a relationship between the (both kinds of) integration. The data point to 
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a positive relationship between integration and IPI budget, but this can thus not be maintained 
convincingly. 
 
EU as sui generis? 
One of the scholarly debates in regionalism – and, to a lesser extent, in studies on IPIs – (Genna & De 
Lombaerde, 2010), is the question whether the EU and its parliament should be considered sui 
generis (i.e. a case in its own). From all of the scatterplots, it becomes clear that the EU represents an 
outlier: its residual is considerably larger than of the other cases. From there, it follows the EU should 
be excluded from the analysis, so as to gain a more adequate image of the effects in the regression 
analyses. Hence, the case of the EP has been excluded and, once more, a hierarchical multiple linear 
regression was conducted (Appendix F, Table F3).  
Excluding the EP has a large impact on the effects of the two independent variables. The effect of 
economic integration has become the largest of all (Model 3, B = -0,074), but has shrunk when 
compared to the model including the EU (Table 4). The effect of institutional integration has become 
negative (Model 3, B = -0,04), but almost one third of the cases is not included in the analysis and the 
result (in the case of institutional integration) should not be taken too seriously. What can be 
concluded more convincingly, is the fact that the EU is an influential case and that the EU could well 
be sui generis. However, as Cofelice and Stavridis (2014, p.159) show, the EU has empowered the 
European Parliament gradually and, therefore, it is plausible younger IPOs could develop in an 
equivalent manner.     
Integration and IPI power 
Thus, taking all of the results presented above into account, the effects of economic integration and 
institutional integration seem rather small and – when excluding the EU – can even become 
marginal. However, when reviewing the first two hypotheses, concerning the relationship between 
integration and the power of IPIs, it should be concluded both are confirmed. Although small, there is 
a positive relationship between each type of integration and the strength of IPIs: the further an IGO 
is integrated economically and institutionally, the more powerful its IPI is.    
 In concluding this, three issues should be noted here nonetheless. First, the number of cases 
in the final models of the multiple linear regressions was seventeen, meaning six of the 23 cases in 
total were excluded in the final model. As discussed above, an important theoretical consideration 
led to this, namely the simple fact that each of these cases does not have (and never had) the 
objective of economic integration and, as such, should not be treated as part of a group of 
economically integrated IGOs. Secondly, it has been found difficult to control for the operational 
level of IGOs. Not only due to complications in adequately conceptualizing the difference between 
the regional and transregional level of operation of IGOs, but also because of difficulties in 
quantifying this dichotomy. In excluding the predictor, the results could be biased. However, this bias 
seems unlikely to be substantial, for the operational status of IGOs is rather unclear and, hence, not 
very influential. Thirdly, the conclusion is based largely on the results of the relationship between 
integration and the competences of IPIs, not on those between integration and the budgets of IPIs. 
The results of the former are more valuable than of the latter, because of the larger number of cases.        
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Initial function  
As can be seen in Table 6 and 7; 16 of the 23 IGOs had an economic initial function, which does not 
necessarily imply all of these have integrated economically. Nonetheless, there is considerable 
overlap between IGOs that had this function and IGOs experiencing some form of economic 
integration and, thus, it is reasonable to expect little difference in the relationship between an 
economic initial function and the power of IPIs.    
Table 6. Initial function IGOs 
IPI Initial function 
Arab Parliament Economic 
Benelux Council Economic 
CARICOM CP Economic 
CEMAC CP Economic 
CPLP PA Social-cultural 
CSTO PA External relations 
EALA Economic 
ECOWAS PA Economic 
EP Economic 
EFTA PC Economic 
IPA CIS Economic 
Nordic Council Social-cultural 
OECS Assembly Economic 
OSCE PA External relations 
PABSEC External relations 
PACE Politcal-constitutional 
PA CEI External relations 
PAP Economic 
Parlacen Economic 
Parlandino Economic 
Parlasur Economic 
UEMOA IPC Economic 
UMA Council Economic 
 
Table 7. Initial function of IGOs 
 Frequency % Mean of groups St. error 
Group 1: other functions 
      
     External relations 
 
 
4 
 
 
17,4 
0,19 0,15 
     Political-   constitutional 1 4,3   
     Social-cultural 
 
2 8,7   
Group 2: economic function   0,30 0,24 
     Economic 16 69,6   
Total 23 100   
 
This presumption is confirmed when an independent t-test is conducted. This test was chosen, for a 
comparison between two “different” groups is made (Table 7). Since what is investigated is the 
difference in effect between one group (economic initial function) and another (all of the initial 
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functions other than economic) on a dependent variable (the level of competences of IPOs), the 
independent t-test is most suitable (Field, 2009, p.324). From the results it becomes clear no 
significant difference can be observed: t (21) = 1,06, p > 0,05. The initial economic function does not 
have a significantly larger impact on the strength of IPOs than other types of functions from which 
integration originates; hence the third hypothesis is rejected.  
Conclusion 
Summarizing, the difference in power of IPOs vis-à-vis “their” IGO can be explained by the level of 
institutional, as well as economic integration - but only to a small extent. The scatterplots (Figure 1a 
and 1b) and regression analyses (Table 4) point to a positive relationship between integration and 
IPO power. However, this conclusion only applies to the level of competences of IPOs, since the 
direction of the  relationship between integration and IPI budgets is less straightforward and, 
therefore, cannot convincingly be maintained. Nonetheless, the two hypotheses stating IPO power 
increases with further integration must be confirmed. At the same time, the initial functions of IGOs - 
although closely related to economic integration – no clear distinction between functions can be 
observed. From the t-test statistics no significant difference between an economic initial function 
and other functions is found. The third hypothesis on the relationship between the economic initial 
function and the power of IPIs is rejected: whether the initial task of an IGO is economic or otherwise 
does not matter when looking at the power of IPIs.   
Apart from integration, what other factors might form a more plausible explanation to the strength 
of IPOs? The number of member states, in all of the regression analyses, as well as the bivariate 
correlation coefficients, has impact as well. Here, however, a negative relationship  is found. The 
effect of the other control variables is smaller. Apart from those variables controlled for, are there 
other possible determinants? Could it be the specific balance between the legislative and executive 
power (Malamud and Sousa, 2007)? Or is, as Moravscik (2005) argues, the control of member states 
over the processes and competences of IGOs still dominant to such an extent that the diversity in 
strength is practically irrelevant? That would not explain why the European Parliament has been 
granted considerable powers and is funded rather generously annually by its member states. Or 
should the European Parliament be regarded simply as an exception? From the scatterplots for each 
of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables, this could be concluded.       
Throughout the research process, a number of issues came forward – apart from those discussed 
already in the conclusion on integration and IPI power. First of all, missing data on staff has formed 
an impetus to a more complete measurement of institutional integration. The same issue applies 
with regard to the budgets of IPOs and IGOs: only 11 of the 23 cases data on the IPO budgets could 
be obtained and for IGO budgets, 10 of the 23. Clearly, transparency in finances and other features of 
the organizations could be improved, with a clear distinction between the European IGOs and the 
others. Secondly, running a principal components analysis for the institutional integration variable 
provided evidence the three indicators should not be merged. It was chosen to continue the 
measurement in this manner however, considering merging the indicators would benefit the 
measurement validity of the concept of institutional integration as a whole. 
In the end, however, it is not solely the factors that contribute to the weakness of IPOs that are of 
relevance, but also the simple fact that IPOs are weak. While increasing democratic legitimacy is the 
main reason for creating IPOs in the first place, empowering an IPO seldom takes place (Cofelice and 
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Stavridis, 2014) and a large number of these institutions seem to solely fulfil the purpose of “talking 
shop”. The parliament of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) has a PPI-score of 
0,156 and can hardly be said to have substantial powers, but convenes weekly. With manifold 
equivalent IPIs, the largest amount of institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation among states 
seems far from having strong democratically legitimated legislative institutions.       
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Appendix A: cases 
International Parliamentary Organs, as identified by Cofelice (2015, p.16) and Cofelice & Stavridis 
(2014, pp.152-153): 
Table A1. Cases 
Name IPI Related IGO 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) Council of Europe 
European Parliament (EP) EU 
Nordic Council Nordic Cooperation 
Benelux Interparliamentary Consultative Council Benelux Economic Union 
EFTA Parliamentary Committee EFTA 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Central European 
Initiative 
CEI 
UMA Council Arab Maghreb Union 
UEMOA IPC West African Economic and Monetary Union 
ECOWAS Parliament ECOWAS 
EALA East African Community 
Pan-African Parliament PAP 
CEMAC CP Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa 
Parlandino Andean Community 
Parlacen CISA 
Parlasur Mercosur 
ACCP Carribean Community and Common Market 
OECS Assembly Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
IPA CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
PABSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
CSTO PA Organization of the Collective Security Treaty 
OSCE PA OSCE 
Arab Parliament League of Arab States 
CPLP PA Community of Portuguese Language Countries 
  
Appendix B: operationalisation economic integration 
Integration Achievement Score, as adopted from Feng and Genna (2003, pp. 301-302): 
1. Trade in Goods and Services 
0 = No agreements made to lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
1 = Preferential Trade Agreement 
2 = Partial Free Trade Area 
3 = Full Free Trade Area 
4 = Customs Union 
5 = No barriers among member countries 
 
2. Degree of Capital Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote capital mobility 
1 = Foreign Direct Investment allowed in limited form 
2 = Capital withdrawal allowed 
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3 = Full access for foreign investment and capital withdrawal, except for national government
 procurement 
4 = Full capital mobility except for large-scale merges and acquisitions 
5 = Full capital mobility without restriction 
 
3. Degree of Labour Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote labour mobility 
1 = Right of movement granted for select professions 
2 = Full right of movement 
3 = Transferability of professional qualifications granted 
4 = Transferability of pensions and other retirement devices 
5 = Full freedom of movement 
 
4. Level of Supranational Institution Importance 
0 = No supranational institutions 
1 = Establishment of nominal institutions 
2 = Information gathering and advisory role 
3 = Ability for institutions to amend proposals 
4 = Ability for institutions to veto proposals  
5 = Supranational institutions operate as primary decision node 
 
5. Degree of Monetary Policy Coordination 
0 = No monetary policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitment to maintain parity 
3 = Coordinated interventions 
4 = Regional Central Bank establishment 
5 = Single currency 
 
6. Degree of Fiscal Policy Coordination 
0 = No fiscal policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitments regarding deficit spending and taxation 
3 = Sanctions regarding breaking commitments  
4 = Uniform tax code 
5 = Single budget   
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Table B1. Integration Achievement Score 2012 
IPI Trade in 
goods and 
services 
Degree of 
capital 
mobility 
Degree of 
labour 
mobility 
Degree of 
monetary 
policy 
coordination 
Degree of 
fiscal policy 
coordination 
Integration 
Achievement 
Score 2012 
Arab 
Parliament 
2 0 0 0 0 0,4 
Benelux 
Council 
5 5 4 2 1 3,4 
CARICOM 
CP 
3 1 5 1 1 2,2 
CEMAC CP 5 1 2 5 2 3 
CPLP PA - - - - - - 
CSTO PA - - - - - - 
EALA 4 3 1 1 2 2,2 
ECOWAS 
PA 
1 1 2 2 1 1,4 
EP 5 4 3 5 2 3,8 
EFTA PC 2 4 4 0 0 2 
IPA CIS 1 1 1 0 0 0,6 
Nordic 
Council 
- - - - - - 
OECS 
Assembly  
3 5 1 5 1 3 
OSCE PA - - - - - - 
PABSEC 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PACE - - - - - - 
PA CEI - - - - - - 
PAP 0 0 0 1 1 0,4 
Parlacen 3 1 1 0 1 1,2 
Parlandino 3 5 2 1 1 2,4 
Parlasur 3 1 1 1 1 1,4 
UEMOA IPC 3 1 1 5 3 3 
UMA 
Council 
0 1 0 0 0 0,2 
 
Appendix C: operationalisation institutional integration 
The scale for determining the degree of supranationality has been adopted from Nye (1968, pp.867-
868), whereby the values of the scale have been modified into the form of the Guttman scale: 
0 = No decisions 
1 = Decisions made by unanimity 
2 = Decisions made by government representatives, veto if appealed 
3 = Decisions made by all government representatives, no veto 
4 = Decisions made by a segment of the membership 
5 = Decisions made by administrative organs  
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The scale for determining the locus of activity is adopted from Lindberg (1970, pp.675-676): 
0 = All activity at the national level 
1 = Preponderance at the national level, some collective 
2 = Substantial activity at collective level, but national is dominant 
3 = Roughly equal activity at both levels 
4 = Collective level is dominant, but substantial national activity 
5 = Preponderance of activity at collective level, small national role 
6 = All activity is at the collective level 
Additionally, the fourth component of the IAS (Appendix B) is used. 
Table C1. Institutional integration 2012 
IPI Degree of 
supranationality 
Locus of activity Level of 
supranational 
institution 
importance 
Institutional 
integration 
2012 
Arab Parliament 3 2 2 2,33 
Benelux Council 1 4 2 2,33 
CARICOM CP 4 2 2 2,667 
CEMAC CP 1 2 2 1,667 
CPLP PA 2 1 1 1,33 
CSTO PA 1 3 2 2 
EALA 1 2 2 1,667 
ECOWAS PA 1 1 2 1,33 
EP 3 5 4 4 
EFTA PC 2 2 2 2 
IPA CIS 1 1 2 1,33 
Nordic Council 1 2 3 2 
OECS Assembly  1 3 2 2 
OSCE PA 2 1 1 1,33 
PABSEC 3 1 2 2 
PACE 3 3 3 3 
PA CEI 1 1 2 1,33 
PAP 3 2 2 2,33 
Parlacen 2 2 2 2 
Parlandino 2 3 4 3 
Parlasur 2 1 3 2 
UEMOA IPC 3 2 3 2,667 
UMA Council 1 0 1 0,667 
 
Appendix D: Operationalisation parliamentary power 
The Parliamentary Power Index was adopted from Cofelice and Stavridis (2014, pp.155-156): 
1. Consultative:  
0 = No consultative powers. 
1 = The IPO may deliver non-binding opinions only upon requests by the inter-governmental 
 /supranational branch. 
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2 = The IPO may deliver non-binding opinions on its own initiative, but only in some limited 
 matters. 
3 = The IPO may deliver non-binding opinions on its own initiative, in all matters of interest 
 for the regional organization. 
4 = In some specific areas, the regional organization decision-making  bodies are compelled 
 to consult the IPO before taking a decision; these bodies subsequently inform the IPO
  about the choice to accept or reject its opinion.  
5 = It is always compulsory for the regional organization decision-making bodies to consult 
 the IPO before taking a decision; these bodies subsequently inform the IPO about the 
 choice to accept or reject its opinion. 
2. Oversight: 
0 = No oversight powers. 
1 = The IPO may invite other institutions to submit reports on their activities for its 
 consideration. 
2 = The IPO has the right to receive oral and written replies to its questions by other bodies 
 of the organization. 
3 = Other bodies of the organization are compelled to prepare regular reports on their 
 activities and submit them to the IPO for its consideration. 
4 = The IPO can adopt motions of censure on the activities of other institutions, and submit 
 them to the main intergovernmental body of the organization: this latter can invite 
 the concerned institution to resign. 
5 = The can adopt motions of censure on the activities of other institutions that are 
 compelled to resign. 
3. Appointments: 
0 = No appointment powers. 
1 = The IPO can be consulted on the appointment of administrative, judicial and/or control
  institutions. 
2 = The IPO can elect/appoint the administrative, judicial and/or control institutions. 
3 = The IPO can be consulted on the appointment of decision-making/supranational bodies 
 of the organization. 
4 = The IPO has the right to approve the appointment of decision-making/supranational 
 bodies of the organization, through a vote of confidence. 
5 = The IPO has the right to appoint/elect the decision-making/supranational bodies of the 
 organization. 
4. Budgetary:  
0 = No budgetary powers. 
1 = The IPO can debate the budget proposal of the organization and express general non-
 binding recommendations. 
2 = The IPO can propose modifications for some limited expenditure  items (and within a rate 
 of maximum increase). 
3 = The IPO has the right to scrutinize the implementation of the budget by other institutions 
 of the organization, and to grant, postpone or refuse discharge in respect of its 
 implementation. 
4 = The IPO can propose modifications for all expenditure items. 
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5 = The IPO can reject the budget proposal: a new draft has to be prepared by the decision-
 making bodies. 
5. Legislative: 
0 = No legislative powers. 
1 = The IPO may request the decision-making bodies to submit appropriate legislative 
  proposals on any matter of interest for the organization. 
2 =The IPO can prepare draft legislative acts and submit them to the decision-making bodies 
 for their consideration; however, the parliamentary proposal may be finally 
 overruled by these bodies. 
3 = The IPO’s assent is required in some specific matters. 
4 = In some specific areas, the IPO has joint legislative powers along with the 
 intergovernmental bodies of the organization: it may propose amendments during all 
 the phases of the legislative process and veto the adoption of legislative proposals it 
 its amendments are not accepted. 
5 = The IPO has joint legislative powers in all subject areas that are relevant for the 
 organization, as well as the right to initiate the legislative procedure and to fix the 
 agenda of the organization. 
Scale for budget of IPIs (budget in euro’s): 
0 = < 500.000 
1 = > 500.000 – 2 million 
2 = > 2 million – 10 million 
3 = > 10 million – 20 million 
4 = > 20 million – 1 billion 
5 = > 1 billion 
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Table D1. Parliamentary Power Index 2016 
IPI Cons. Overs. App. Budget. Leg. PPI 
Arab Parliament 3 2 0 1 0 0,2 
Benelux Council 2 0 0 1 0 0,089 
CARICOM CP 3 1 0 1 0 0,156 
CEMAC CP 4 4 0 4 3 0,578 
CPLP PA 3 2 0 0 0 0,156 
CSTO PA 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
EALA 3 3 0 1 2 0,333 
ECOWAS PA 4 2 3 4 4 0,667 
EP 4 5 4 5 4 0,889 
EFTA PC 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
IPA CIS 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
Nordic Council 4 3 0 1 2 0,356 
OECS Assembly  1 0 0 0 1 0,067 
OSCE PA 3 2 0 1 0 0,2 
PABSEC 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
PACE 4 3 2 1 2 0,444 
PA CEI 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
PAP 3 2 0 1 2 0,289 
Parlacen 3 2 1 1 2 0,333 
Parlandino 3 2 0 1 1 0,244 
Parlasur 4 3 0 1 2 0,356 
UEMOA IPC 3 2 2 1 2 0,378 
UMA Council 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
 
Table D2. IPI and IGO budgets (in euro’s; 2016) 
IPI Budget IPI Budget IGO Budget IPI Score 
Arab Parliament - -  
Benelux Council 641.854 7.956.800 1 
CARICOM CP - -  
CEMAC CP 8.254.338 89.640.140 2 
CPLP PA - 1.500.000  
CSTO PA - -  
EALA 14.579.090 97.497.884 3 
ECOWAS PA - 528.720.000  
EP 1.686.211.469 144.000.000.000 5 
EFTA PC 1.901.333 19.793.076 1 
IPA CIS - -  
Nordic Council 4.433.637 5.360.000 2 
OECS Assembly  - -  
OSCE PA 3.102.000 141.107.600 2 
PABSEC - -  
PACE 16.603.600 442.255.900 3 
PA CEI - 5.250.000  
PAP 28.574.944 367.260.114 4 
Parlacen 13.263.851 - 3 
Parlandino - -  
Parlasur 1.705.526 - 1 
UEMOA IPC - 202.000.000  
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UMA Council - -  
 
Appendix E: Data control variables 
Table E1. Data control variables 
IPI Dominant regime type “Age” # member states 
Arab Parliament 3,54 11 22 
Benelux Council 8,58 61 3 
CARICOM CP 6,329 20 15 
CEMAC CP 2,4 6 6 
CPLP PA 5,18 7 9 
CSTO PA 3,55 9 6 
EALA 4,3410 15 6 
ECOWAS PA 4,64 16 15 
EP 7,97 64 28 
EFTA PC 9,5311 39 4 
IPA CIS 3,8 24 1012 
Nordic Council 9,42 63 5 
OECS Assembly 6,3213 4 7 
OSCE PA 6,8414 24 57 
PABSEC 5,58 23 12 
PACE 7,3115 67 47 
PA CEI 6,62 17 18 
PAP16 4,31 12 54 
Parlacen 6,47 25 717 
Parlandino 6,21 32 4 
Parlasur 6,7 22 5 
UEMOA IPC 4,34 18 8 
UMA Council 4,31 23 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9 No data available on Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Monserrat, Saint Lucia, St Kitts 
and Nevis, St Vincent and Grenadines in the EUI 
10 No data available on South Sudan in the EUI 
11 No data available on Liechtenstein in the EUI. 
12 Although Ukraine formally is not a member, it de facto participates 
13 The score was duplicated from the most closely related IGO (the CARICOM) for no data was available on the 
level of democracy of any of its member states 
14 No data available on Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino in the EUI 
15 No data available on Liechtenstein, San Marino and Andorra in the EUI 
16 No data available on South Sudan, Somalia, Seychelles, Sao Tomé and Principe and the Sahrawi Republic 
17 The Dominican Repuplic is not considered a full member, but a partner member 
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Appendix F: statistical results 
Table F1. Tests for normality of the predictors 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
Institutional 
integration 
0,33 8 0,01* 0,72 8 0,003** 
Economic 
integration 
0,14 8 0,20 0,97 8 0,90 
PPI 0,27 8 0,10 0,89 8 0,26 
Budget IPI 0,21 8 0,20 0,89 8 0,24 
Dominant 
regime type 
0,16 8 0,20 0,96 8 0,79 
Age IPI 0,22 8 0,20 0,89 8 0,21 
Number of 
member 
states 
0,40 8 0,000*** 0,66 8 0,001** 
  ***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, *p < 0,05 
Table F2. Skewness and kurtosis values 
 Institutional 
integration 
PPI IAS Budget 
IPI 
Dominant 
regime 
type 
Age of 
IPI 
Number 
of 
member 
states 
Skewness 0,71 1,32 0,006 0,63 0,301 1,18 15,35 
Std. Error 0,48 0,48 0,55 0,66 0,48 0,48 8,00 
Z-score 
skewness 
1,47 2,74* 0,01 0,95 0,63 2,46* 1,92 
        
Kurtosis 1,34 1,68 -1,28 -0,14 -0,55 0,27 0,48 
Std. Error 0,94 0,94 1,06 1,28 0,94 0,94 2,22 
Z-score 
kurtosis 
1,43 1,79 -1,21 -0,11 -0,59 0,29 0,22 
*larger than 1,96 at p<0,05.    
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Table F3. Hierarchical multiple linear regression for the PPI with the EP excluded 
 Model  1      Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     B                     B     B                      B                    
(intercept)   0,16             0,19  0,277   0,423           
 (0,17) (0,09) (1,180) (0,208) 
Institutional 
integration 
  0,04            
(0,08) 
  -0,05              
(0,094) 
 -0,036              
(1,108) 
Economic 
integration 
 
  0,03 
(0,04) 
 0,043             
(0,049) 
-0,074               
(0,058) 
Dominant regime 
type 
   -0,040               
(0,040) 
Age of IPI     -0,002              
(0,005) 
Number of member 
states 
    0,002               
(0,005) 
     
R2 0,02 0,04 0,058 0,330 
Adj. R2 -0,06 -0,04 -0,087 -0,004 
N 22 16 16 16 
Note: OLS-regression coefficients, with standard deviations between brackets
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Appendix G: Sources 
Table G1. Documents consulted for measurement of any of the variables 
IPI Primary and secondary sources consulted 
Arab 
Parliament 
Primary sources: 
1. League of Arab States (2016). Member States. Retrieved from 
http://www.lasportal.org/ar/aboutlas/Pages/CountryData.aspx 
Secondary sources: 
1. Comandulli, M. & Rishmawi, M. (2010). League of Arab States (LAS). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2. Hoekman, B. & Sekkat, K. (2010). Arab economic Integration: The missing links. Sciences Po Working Paper April 2010. 
Requested from http://gem.sciences-po.fr/content/publications/pdf/Hoekman_Sekkat_Arab_RI042010.pdf 
 
Benelux 
Council 
Primary sources: 
1. Benelux Council (2014). Plenair Verslag maart 2014. Retrieved from http://archive.benelux-
parlement.eu/docs/02_PlenaireZitting/PV_verslag_maart2014_nl.pdf 
2. Benelux Economic Union (2012). Verdrag tot herziening van het op 3 februari 1958 gesloten verdrag tot instelling van de 
Benelux Economische Unie. Retrieved from http://www.benelux.int/nl/benelux-unie/nieuw-benelux-verdrag 
3. Benelux Economic Union (2015). Beschikking van het Benelux Comité van Ministers betreffende de automatische 
wederzijdse generieke niveauerkenning van diploma’s hoger onderwijs. 
4. Benelux Economic Union (2016). De geschiedenis van de Benelux Unie. Retrieved from http://www.benelux.int/nl/benelux-
unie/tijdlijn 
5. Benelux Economic Union (2016). Instellingen. Retrieved from http://www.benelux.int/nl/benelux-unie/instellingen 
6. Benelux Economic Union (2016). Over de Benelux. Retrieved from http://www.benelux.int/nl/benelux-unie/benelux-een-
oogopslag/ 
Secondary sources: 
1. Limonard, B. & Stöger, J. (2013). De Benelux Unie naar waarde schatten. Internationale Spectator, 67(6), 52-57. 
2. Sauerwein, F. (2013). Benelux (Economic) Union. In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
3. Wouters, J. & Vidal, M. (2008). Towards a Rebirth of Benelux? Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working 
Paper 2, 2-29. 
 
CARICOM CP Primary sources: 
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1. Caribbean Community (1973). Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. Retrieved from  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/caricom/trt_caricom_2.pdf 
2. Caribbean Community (1989). Agreement for the Establishment Establishment of an Assembly of Caribbean Community 
Parliamentarians. Requested from http://archive.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/agreement_accp.jsp 
3. Caribbean Community (2016). Member states and associate members. Retrieved from http://www.caricom.org/ 
4. Caribbean Community (2016). Macro Policy Coordination. Retrieved from http://caricom.org/macro-policy-coordination/ 
5. Caribbean Community (2016). Who we are. Retrieved from http://caricom.org/about-caricom/who-we-are 
Secondary sources: 
1. Byron, D. & Malcolm, C. (2009). Caribbean Community (CARICOM). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2. Griffin, C. (2012). Regional Integration in the Carribean: A Sisyphean Odyssey. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations, 13(2),103-120. 
3. Kwon, G., Panth, S., Chai, J., Guerson, A., Casselle, G. & Espinoza, R. (2008). In Bauer, C., Cashin, P., Panth, S. (Eds.), The 
Caribbean: enhancing economic integration (pp.3-41). Washington D.C.: IMF. 
4. Winters, L. (2008). The temporary Movement of Workers to provide Services. In Mattoo, A., Stern, R., Zanini, G. (Eds.), A 
Handbook of International Trade in Services (pp.480-540). New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
CEMAC CP Primary sources: 
1. Central African Economic and Monetary Community (2008). Traité Revisé de la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de 
l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC). Yaoundé: CEMAC. 
2. Central African Economic and Monetary Community (2009). Convention Parlement CEMAC. Retrieved from 
http://www.cemac.int/sites/default/files/documents/files/convention_parlement_cemac.pdf 
3. Central African Economic and Monetary Community (2016). La CEMAC en bref. Retrieved from 
http://www.cemac.int/apropos 
Secondary sources: 
1. International Democracy Watch (2012). Central African Economic and Monetary Community. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/central-african-economic-and-monetary-community 
2. International Monetary Fund (2013). Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC): Staff report on 
common policies for member countries. IMF Country Report 13(322). 
3. Nono, G. (2014). Integration Efforts in Central Africa: The Case of CEMAC. UNU-CRIS Working Paper 2014(16). 
 
CPLP PA Primary sources: 
1. Community of Portuguese Language Countries (2007). Estatutos da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa. 
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Retrieved from http://www.cplp.org/id-3869.aspx 
2. Community of Portuguese Language Countries (2007) Resolução sobre o Estabelecimento da Assembleia Parlamentar da 
CPLP. 
3. Community of Portuguese Language Countries (2016). Estados-membros. Retrieved from http://www.cplp.org/id-
2597.aspx 
4. Community of Portuguese Language Countries (2016). Histórico – Como Surgiu? Retrieved from http://www.cplp.org/id-
2752.aspx 
 
CSTO PA Primary sources: 
1. Organization of the Collective Security Treaty (2016). Structure CSTO. Retrieved from http://www.odkb-csto.org/structure/ 
Secondary sources: 
1 Douhan, A. (2013). Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2 Nikitina, Y. (2012). The Collective Security Treaty through the Looking Glass. Problems of Post-Communism, 59(3), 41-52. 
 
EALA Primary sources: 
1. East African Community (2001). Rules of procedure of the East African Legislative Assembly. 
2. East African Community (2007). The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. Arusha: East African 
Community. 
3. East African Legislative Assembly (2015). EALA debates and approves Budget. Requested from 
http://www.eala.org/media/view/eala-debates-and-approves-eac-budget  
4. East African Community (2016). Overview of EAC. Retrieved from http://www.eac.int/about/overview 
5. East African Community (2016). EAC Organs. Retrieved from http://www.eac.int/about/organs 
Secondary sources: 
1. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2015). The Civil Society Guide to Regional Economic Communities: East 
African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). Banjul: ACPHR. 
2. Basnett, Y. (2013). Labour Mobility in East Africa: An Analysis of the East African Community’s Common Market and the 
Free Movement of Workers. Development Policy Review, 31(2), 131-148. 
3. Gupta, S. & McHugh, J. (2012). East African Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy: Current and Future Challenges. In Davoodi, 
H. (Ed.), The East African Community after ten Years: Deepening Integration (pp.59-75). Requested from 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/afr/2012/121712.pdf 
4. Lepetit, L., Rugemintwari, C. & Strobel, F. (2015). Monetary, Financial and Fiscal Stability in the East African Community: 
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Ready for a Monetary Union? The World Economy, 38(8), 1179-1204. Doi: 10.1111/twec.12243 
5. Morales, R. (2012). Monetary Policy Harmonization in the East African Community. In Davoodi, H. (Ed.), The East African 
Community after ten Years: Deepening Integration (pp.76-88). Requested from 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/afr/2012/121712.pdf 
6. Plenk, S. (2015). Regionale Integration im sub-saharischen Afrika: Eine Analyse von EAC, SADC und ECOWAS. Wiesbaden: 
Springer VS. 
7. Tanza, J. (2016). South Sudan Official: Country will benefit from joining EAC. Retrieved from 
http://www.voanews.com/content/government-says-south-sudan-will-benefit-by-joining-eac/3217788.html 
8. Yabara, M. (2012). Capital Market Integration: Progress ahead of the East African Community Monetary Union. IMF 
Working Paper 12(18). 
 
ECOWAS PA Primary sources: 
1. ECOWAS (1993). ECOWAS Revised Treaty. Requested from http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-law/treaties/ 
2. ECOWAS (2011). ECOWAS Parliament 3rd Legislature: Rules of Procedure. Requested from http://www.parl.ecowas.int/ 
3. Economic Community of West African States (2015). Member States. Retrieved from http://www.ecowas.int/member-
states/ 
Secondary sources: 
1. Adeniran, A. (2012). Regional Integration in the ECOWAS Region: Challenges and Opportunities. The Africa Portal 
Backgrounder, 19 (January 2012), 1-6. 
2. Agbonkhese, A. & Adekola, A. (2014). Regional economic Integration in developing Countries: a Case Study of Nigeria; a 
Member of ECOWAS. European Scientific Journal, 10(19), 359-374. 
3. Awumbila, M., Benneh, Y., Teye, J. & Atiim, G. (2014). Across artificial borders: An assessment of labour migration in the 
ECOWAS region. ACP Observatory on Migration. 
4. Berger, A. & Hamady, O. (2014). Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
5. Boré, L. & Henkel, F. (2015). Disturbing a Cosy Balance? The ECOWAS Parliament’s Rocky Road to Co-Decision. Berlin: 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
6. Plenk, S. (2015). Regionale Integration im sub-saharischen Afrika: Eine Analyse von EAC, SADC und ECOWAS. Wiesbaden: 
Springer VS. 
 
EP Primary sources:  
1. Council of the European Union (2016). EU annual budget: 2016. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/policies/eu-annual-
budget/2016/ 
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2. European Commission (2015). Free movement of capital. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital/index_en.htm 
3. European Commission (2015). Banking and Finance: Overview. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital/overview_en.htm#when 
4. European Parliament (2015). Rules of procedure of the European Parliament, 8th parliament term 2015. 
5. European Union (1988). Council Directive 88/361/EEC. Requested from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31988L0361 
6. European Union (2016). EU member countries. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ 
Secondary sources: 
1. Barslund, M. & Busse, M. (2014). Making the most of EU Labour Mobility: Report of a CEPS taskforce. Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies. 
2. Barslund, M., Busse, M. & Schwarzwälder, J. (2015). Labour Mobility in Europe: An untapped resource? CEPS Policy Brief, 
327, 1-6. 
3. Cini, M. & Borragán, N. (2013). Introduction. In Cini, M. & Borragán, N. (Eds.), European Union Politics (pp.1-8). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
4. Egan, M. (2013). The Single Market. In Cini, M. & Borragán, N. (Eds.), European Union Politics (pp.254-267). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
5. Genna, G. & Hiroi, T. (2015). Regional Integration and democratic Conditionality: How Democracy Clauses help democratic 
Consolidation and deepening. New York: Routledge. 
6. Verdun, A. (2013). Economic and Monetary Union. In Cini, M. & Borragán, N. (Eds.), European Union Politics (pp.296-308). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
EFTA PC Primary sources:  
1. European Free Trade Association (2009). Committtee of Members of Parliament of the EFTA Countries: Rules of Procedure. 
Requested from www.efta.int/.../1101581-v1-090623_CMP_Rules_of_Procedure.pdf 
2. European Free Trade Association (2010). Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association. Requested from 
http://www.efta.int/legal-texts/efta-convention 
3. European Free Trade Association (2015). This is EFTA 2015. Belgium: EFTA. 
4. European Free Trade Association (2016). EFTA Budget. Requested from http://www.efta.int/About-EFTA/EFTA-Budget-748 
5. European Free Trade Association (2016). The EFTA States. Retrieved from http://www.efta.int/about-efta/the-efta-states 
Secondary sources: 
1. Harpaz, G. (2009). European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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IPA CIS Primary sources: 
1. Commonwealth of Independent States (2012). Budget. Requested from http://e-cis.info/page.php?id=22930 
Secondary sources: 
1. Hartwell, C. (2013). A Eurasian (or a Soviet) Union? Consequences of further economic integration in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Business Horizons, 56(4), 411-420. Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2013.03.003 
2. International Democracy Watch (2012). Commonwealth of Independent States. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/commonwealth-of-indipendent-states 
3. International Democracy Watch (2012). CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/cis-inter-parliamentary-assembly 
4. Nadbath, E. (2015). Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Virtual Map of 
Interparliamentary Cooperation (VIPCO), requested from https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/projects/paco-project/vipco-
1/vipco-factsheet-europe-ipacis.pdf 
5. Obydenkova, A. (2011). Comparative Regionalism: Eurasian cooperation and European integration. The case for 
neofunctionalism? Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2(2), 87-102. Doi: 10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.001 
 
Nordic 
Council 
Primary sources: 
1. Kinsten, S. & Orava, H. (2012). The Nordic Council – our council. Albertslund: Nordic Council. 
2. Nordic Co-operation (1996). Helsinki Treaty. Retrieved from http://www.norden.org/en/om-samarbejdet-1/nordic-
agreements/treaties-and-agreements/basic-agreement/the-helsinki-treaty 
3. Nordic Co-operation (2016). About the Nordic Council  of Ministers. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/ANP2012-737 
4. Nordic Cooperation (2016). Financing. Requested from http://www.norden.org/en/om-samarbejdet-1/financing  
5. Nordic Council (2016). Decision-making Process in Nordic Council. Retrieved from http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-
council/policy-documents-and-processes-1/decision-making-process-in-nordic-council 
Secondary sources: 
1. Etzold, T. (2013). The Case of the Nordic Councils: Mapping multilateralism in transition no.1. New York: International Peace 
Institute. 
 
OECS 
Assembly 
Primary sources: 
1. OECS (2010). Revised Treaty of Basseterre establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Economic Union. 
Requested from http://www.oecs.org/publications/treaties-agreements  
2. Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (2016). Member States. Retrieved from http://www.oecs.org/about-the-
oecs/who-we-are/member-states 
Secondary sources: 
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1. Cebotari, A., Schipke, A. & Thacker, N. (2013). The Eastern Caribbean Economic and Currency Union: Overview and key 
Issues. In Cebotari, A., Schipke, A. & Thacker, N., The Eastern Caribbean Economic and Currency Union: macroeconomics 
and financial systems (pp.3-22). Washington D.C.: IMF. 
2. Kim, Y. & Zhao, X. (2014). Is the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union an Optimum Currency Area? The Journal of Developing 
Areas, 48(1), 291-313. Doi: 10.1353/jda.2014.0009 
3. McIntyre, A., Nassar, K. & Schipke, A. (2013). Economic Integration and the Institutional Setup of the OECS/ECCU.  In 
Cebotari, A., Schipke, A. & Thacker, N., The Eastern Caribbean Economic and Currency Union: macroeconomics and financial 
systems (pp.53-76). Washington D.C.: IMF. 
4. O’Brien, D. (2007). Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
OSCE PA Primary sources: 
1. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2016). Budget. Requested from http://www.osce.org/budget 
2. Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2016). Factsheet. Retrieved from 
https://www.oscepa.org/documents/factsheet/669-factsheet-english/file 
3. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2016). Participating States. Retrieved from 
http://www.osce.org/states 
4. Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2016). Rules of Procedure. Requested 
from http://www.oscepa.org/documents/rules-of-procedure/1832-rules-of-procedure-english/file 
5. Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (2016). What is the OSCE? Requested from 
http://www.osce.org/whatistheosce/factsheet 
Secondary sources: 
1. Fastenrath, U. & Weichelt, K. (2010). Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
PABSEC Primary sources: 
1. PABSEC (2015). Rules of Procedure. Requested from http://www.pabsec.org/Documents.asp?id=1 
2. Black Sea Economic Cooperation (1999). Charter of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Requested 
from http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/organization-of-the-black-sea-economic-cooperation-
treaties-and-protocols/379-charter-of-the-organization-of-the-black-sea-economic-cooperation-1999 
3. Black Sea Economic Cooperation (2016). Member states. Retrieved from http://www.bsec-
organization.org/member/Pages/member.aspx 
Secondary sources: 
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1. International Democracy Watch (2012). Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/organization-of-the-black-sea-economic-cooperation 
2. Schülz, L. & Dürkop, C. (2014). The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) – A mechanism for 
integration in a geopolitically sensitive area. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 10 November 2014, p.1-11. 
 
PACE Primary sources: 
1. Council of Europe (1949). Statute of the Council of Europe. European Treaty Series, 1. Requested from 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/001 
2. Council of Europe (2016). Our Member States. Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states 
3. Council of Europe (2016). Resolution 2046: Expenditure of the Parliamentary Assembly for the biennium 2016-2017.  
4. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2014). Origins and history. Retrieved from http://website-
pace.net/web/apce/history 
5. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2014). The powers of the Assembly. Retrieved from http://website-
pace.net/en_GB/web/apce/Powers 
6. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2016). Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. Retrieved from 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/RoP/RoP-XML2HTML-EN.asp 
Secondary sources: 
1. Habegger, B. (2010). Democratic Accountability of International Organizations: Parliamentary Control within the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE and the Prospects for the United Nations. Cooperation and Conflict, 45(2), 186-204. 
2. Macmullen, A. (2004). Intergovernmental functionalism? The Council of Europe in European integration. Journal of 
European Integration, 26(4), 405-429. 
 
PA CEI Primary sources: 
1. Central European Initiative (2008). Central European Initiative: Guidelines and Rules of Procedure. Requested from 
http://www.cei.int/content/official-documents 
2. Central European Initiative (2009). Central European Initiative 1989-2009. Trieste: CEI. 
3. Central European Initiative (2009). Rules of procedure of the CEI Parliamentary Dimension. 
4. Central European Initiative (2014). Member States. Retrieved from http://www.cei.int/content/member-states 
5. Central European Initiative (2014). Mission & Objectives. Retrieved from http://www.cei.int/content/mission-objectives 
Secondary sources: 
1. Cviic, C. (1999). The Central European Initiative. In Cottey, A. (Ed.), Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe: Building 
Security, Prosperity and Solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea (pp.113-127). New York: Palgrave.  
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PAP Primary sources: 
1. African Union (2016). African Union Handbook 2016. Addis Ababa: African Union Commission. 
2. African Union (2016). Member States of the AU. Retrieved from http://www.au.int/en/AU_Member_States 
3. African Union (2016). History of the OAU and AU. Retrieved from http://au.int/en/history/oau-and-au 
4. PAP (2014). Protocol to the constitutive act of the African Union relating to the Pan-African Parliament. Retrieved from 
http://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-constitutive-act-african-union-relating-pan-african-parliament 
Secondary sources: 
1. Karns, M. & Mingst, K. (2010). International Organizations: the Politics and Processes of Global Governance. Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers 
2. Southern African Legal Information Institute (2015). Budget of the African Union for the 2016 financial Year. Requested 
from http://www.saflii.org/au/AUDECISIONS/2015/19.html 
3. Viljoen, F. (2011). African Union (AU). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
4. Zamfir, I. (2015). At a Glance: Economic Integration under the African Union. European Parliamentary Research Service, 
March 2015. 
 
Parlacen Primary sources: 
1. Central American Integration System (1962). Tegucigalpa Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of Central American 
States (ODECA). 
2. Central American Integration System (1987). Tratado Constitutivo del Parlamento Centroamericano y Otras Instancias 
Políticas. 
3. Central American Integration System (2008). Protocolo de Reformas al Tratado Constitutivo del Parlamento 
Centroamericano 
4. Central American Integration System (2016). Member States. Retrieved from 
http://www.sica.int/miembros/miembros_en.aspx 
Secondary sources: 
1. Cortado, R. (2013). Central American Integration System (SICA). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2. International Democracy Watch (2012). Central American Integration System. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/monitored-igos/america/558-central-american-integration-
system 
3. La Hora (2015). Senalan alto costo e inoperancia del Parlamento Centroamericano. Requested from 
http://lahora.gt/senalan-alto-costo-e-inoperancia-del-parlamento-centroamericano/ 
9 
 
4. Papageorgiou, I. (2011). International Democracy Report 2011: Central American Integration System. Moncalieri: Centre for 
Studies on Federalism. 
5. Schipke, A. & Desruelle, D. (2008). Moving forward with economic Integration and Cooperation. In Desruelle, D. & Schipke, 
A. (eds.), Central America: economic progress and reforms. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, Western 
Hemisphere Dept (pp.13-33). 
 
Parlandino Primary sources: 
1. Andean Community (2010). Reseña Histórica. Retrieved from 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/Seccion.aspx?id=195&tipo=QU&title=resena-historica 
2. Andean Community (2010). Somos Comunidad Andina. Retrieved from 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/Seccion.aspx?id=189&tipo=QU&title=somos-comunidad-andina 
3. Parlandino (1997). Additional Protocol to the Treaty establishing the Andean Parliament. Requested from 
http://www.parlamentoandino.org/index.php/acerca-de/normatividad/protocolo-adicional  
4. Parlandino (2006). Reglamento General del Parlamento Andino. Requested from 
http://www.parlamentoandino.org/index.php/acerca-de/normatividad/reglamento-general 
Secondary sources: 
1. Albarracín, J. & Erthal, J. (2009). Candidate Selection, direct Elections and Democracy in integration Parliaments: the Case of 
the Andean Parliament. July 12 to 16; World Congress of Political Science, 1-30, retrieved from 
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_2406.pdf 
2. Encyclopedia Britannica (2016). Andean Community. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/topic/Andean-Community 
3. Gomez, E. (2014). At a Glance: The Andean Community: economic Integration. European Parliamentary Research Service, 
December 2014. 
4. International Democracy Watch (2012). Andean Parliament. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/andean-parliament 
5. Porrata-Doria Jr, R. (2013). Andean Community of Nations (CAN). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Parlasur Primary sources: 
1. Mercosur (2016). Em poucas palavras. Retrieved from http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/5908/2/innova.front/em-
poucas-palavras 
2. Parlasur (2014). Presupuesto del Mercosur 2014. Requested from 
http://parlamentodelmercosur.org/innovaportal/file/151/1/presupuesto_del_parlamento_del_mercosur__2014.pdf 
Secondary sources: 
10 
 
1. Schmidt, J. (2008). Mercosur. In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
2. Zellers, A. (2013). Regionale Integration: die EU und der MERCOSUR im Vergleich. Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag. 
 
UEMOA IPC Primary sources:  
1. Agence Ecofin (2013). L’UEMOA établit son Budget 2013 à 202 Millions. Requested from 
http://www.agenceecofin.com/gestion-publique/2811-7790-l-uemoa-etablit-son-budget-2013-a-202-millions 
2. Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (2015). Dates clés: Les dates qui ont marqué  la vie de la BCEAO. 
Retrieved from http://www.bceao.int/Dates-cles-3 
3. West African Economic and Monetary Union (1994). Traité modifié de l’Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine 
(UEMOA). Requested from http://www.uemoa.int/Documents/TraitReviseUEMOA.pdf 
4. Western African Economic and Monetary Union (2010). Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine. Retrieved from 
http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/Home.aspx 
Secondary sources: 
1. International Monetary Fund (2015). West African Economic and Monetary Union: Common policies of member countries. 
IMF Country Report 15(100), 1-48. 
2. Kireyev, A. (2015). How to Improve the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union. IMF Working Paper 15(99), 1-36. 
3. Kumar, S., Sen, R. & Srivastava, S. (2014). Does Economic Integration stimulate Capital Mobility? An Analysis of four 
regional economic Communities in Africa. AUT Business Working Paper 2014(05), 1-27. 
4. Oxford Business Group (2009). The Report: Senegal 2009.  
5. Oxford Business Group (2016). Standing together: Plans to create a regional economic union are under way. Retrieved from 
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/standing-together-plans-create-regional-economic-union-are-under-way-0 
6. Ndeye, J. (2012). The Coordination of fiscal Policies in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). 
Requested from http://repository.eac.int/ 
7. Seck, D. (2013). Fifteen Years of WAEMU: Results and Strategies for the Future. In Ayuk, E. & Kaboré, S. (Eds.), Wealth 
through Integration: Regional Integration and Poverty-Reduction Strategies in West Africa (pp.19-42). New York: Springer 
Verlag. Doi: 10.1007/978-1-4614-4415-2 
8. Stephenson, S. & Hufbauer, G. (2011). Labor Mobility. In Chauffour, J. & Maur, J. (Eds.), Preferential Trade Agreement 
Policies for Development: A Handbook (pp.275-306). Washington DC: The World Bank. Requested from 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2329/634040PUB0Pref00Box0361517B0PUBLIC0.pdf?seq
uence=4 
 
11 
 
UMA Council Primary sources: 
1. Arab Maghreb Union (1989). Traité Instituant l’Union du Maghreb Arabe. Requested from 
http://www.maghrebarabe.org/images/traite_de_marrakech.pdf 
2. Arab Magreb Union (2016). Historique.  Retrieved from http://www.maghrebarabe.org/fr/uma.cfm 
3. Arab Maghreb Union (2016). Objectifs et Missions. Retrieved from http://www.maghrebarabe.org/fr/obj.cfm 
Secondary sources: 
1. Martinez, L. (2006). Algeria, the Arab Maghreb Union and Regional Integration. Euromesco Paper 59, October 2006, 1-44. 
2. Mortimer, R. (1999). The Arab Maghreb Union: Myth and Reality. In Zoubir, Y. (Ed.), North Africa in Transition: State, 
Society and Economic Transformation in the 1990s (pp.177-194). Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
3. Ouaissa, R. (2007). Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). In Redman, A. (Ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
